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Abstract— Defence-in-depth is a term often used in security 
literature to denote architectures in which multiple security 
protection systems are deployed to defend the valuable assets of 
an organization (e.g. the data and the services).  In this paper we 
present an approach for analysing defence-in-depth, and 
illustrate the use of the approach with an empirical study in 
which we have assessed the detection capabilities of intrusion 
detection systems when deployed in diverse, two-version, parallel 
defence-in-depth configurations. The configurations have been 
assessed in settings that favour detection of attacks (reducing 
false negatives), as well as settings that favour legitimate traffic 
(reducing false positives). 
Keywords— diversity analysis; security analysis; quantitative 
assessment; intrusion detection systems; 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An important part of design for security is defence in depth, 
consisting of “layers” of defence that reduce the probability of 
successful attacks. Guidance documents now advocate defence 
in depth as an obvious need1, but their qualitative guidance 
ignores the decision problems. Crucially, these questions 
concern diversity: defences should be diverse in their 
weaknesses. Any attack that happens to defeat one defence 
should with high probability be stopped or detected by another 
one. Ultimately, diversity and defence in depth are two facets 
of the same defensive design approach. The important 
questions are not about defence in depth being "a good idea", 
but about whether a set of specific defences would improve 
security more than another set; and about – if possible – 
quantifying the security gains. In this paper, we present 
analysis approach to help analysts with these decision 
problems. We illustrate the use of the approach with data from 
an empirical study with multiple Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDSs). We study the effects that using diverse IDSs has on the 
detection of attacks (false negatives), and on allowing 
legitimate traffic to go through (false positives).  
We utilize a dataset [1]2 from an experiment by two of the 
authors of this paper in which an attack injection methodology 
was used, consisting of injecting realistic vulnerabilities in 
three web applications (MyReferences, phpBB and TikiWiki) 
and performing attacks that attempt to exploit those 
vulnerabilities. To protect these web applications, four diverse 
IDS products were deployed (Apache Scalp, Anomalous 
Character Distribution (ACD) monitor, GreenSQL and Snort). 
                                                           
1 www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/support/defenseindepth.pdf  
2 Full dataset of [1] is available from: https://goo.gl/MDOhsw 
Some of these IDSs were configured in different ways 
(depending, for example, on the rulesets they used and the 
threshold for identifying malicious requests), which produced 9 
different IDS configurations (five ACD variants, one Apache 
Scalp, one GreenSQL and two Snorts). [1] presents analysis of 
the performance of individual IDSs.  
The focus of the new work is on two-system diversity: 
combining two IDSs in a parallel configuration, i.e. both 
systems inspect all the inputs and pass their individual 
decisions to a voter. We chose to study two-system 
configurations as this is the minimum amount of diversity that 
an organization can deploy to help it improve security, and they 
carry the least additional cost in complexity and deployment.  
Since we have 9 different IDS product configurations, we can 
construct 36 distinct two-version IDS combinations (9C2 = 36). 
Each system is asked whether a given input is malicious or not. 
Hence, we use the conventional statistical measures of the 
performance of a binary classification test3 (i.e. Sensitivity - 
True Positive rate, and Specificity - True Negative rate and 
Accuracy). We analysed these measures for each of the 36 
combinations of IDSs for each of the three web applications.  
In this paper we describe the analysis methodology, provide 
a summary of the main findings and give a snapshot of the 
most interesting results. Throughout the paper we refer the 
interested reader to the full results that are available as an 
extended technical report [2].  The analysis approach followed 
in this paper provides a methodology for decision making 
when configuring defence-in-depth architectures. Hence, it is 
easily transferrable to other datasets.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section II describes 
the dataset and our analysis method. Section III provides the 
main results of our analysis. Section IV introduces related work 
and Section V presents conclusions and limitations.  
II. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
The data used for the diversity analysis is from an 
experiment conducted by two of the authors of this paper [1]. 
The previous analysis assessed IDSs in terms of their 
capability of detecting SQL Injection attacks. SQL Injection 
attacks continue to be the most prevalent and typical threat for 
web applications, as they have been for the last decade4. In 
order to produce realistic SQL Injection attacks to test the 
IDSs a Vulnerability and Attack Injection technique was used. 
                                                           
3 See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensitivity_and_specificity  
4 https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project 
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This technique allowed the introduction of realistic 
vulnerabilities in the code of a web application by code 
mutation (Vulnerability injection) and afterwards to 
automatically exploit those vulnerabilities by performing SQL 
injection attacks (Attack Injection). The injected 
vulnerabilities are considered realistic because they were 
based on an extensive field study on real web application 
vulnerabilities [3]. The vulnerability and attack injection tool5 
runs on a Ubuntu virtual machine, configured to inject 
vulnerabilities in a set of three web applications. The IDSs 
under test were deployed in the same virtual machine, and 
exposed to attacks generated by the attack injector and to non-
malicious interactions carried out through a web crawler.  The 
experimental setup described in [1] included 4 different IDSs:  
- Anomalous Character Distribution (ACD) monitor – an 
anomaly-based tool that works at the application level. It 
analyses the Apache access log [4]. The user must define 
the deviation threshold that separates the requests identified 
as malicious from those considered benign. The threshold 
values used are: 1, 3, 10, 30, and 100. We refer to these 
IDSs configurations as ACD1, ACD3, ACD10, ACD30 and 
ACD100, and label them 1A-5A respectively (“A” stands 
for “Application” type IDS). 
- GreenSQL (version 1.2.2) – a database proxy that monitors 
the SQL traffic and detects attacks targeting the database. 
We used the open source version of the tool6. We label it as 
6D in our analysis (“D” standing for “Database” IDS). 
- Apache Scalp (version 0.4)7 – a signature-based apache 
access log analyser. We refer to it as SCALP sqlia (SQL 
Injection Attacks) and label it 7A in the graphs and tables. 
- Snort (versions 2.8.4.1) (snort.org) is a signature based 
network level IDS. In [1] the analysis was performed using 
two configurations: using only the official community rule 
set; and using a set of experimental Customized Rules 
provided in [6]). We labelled them 8N and 9N (“N” 
standing for “Network”). 
The experimental setup described in [1] includes three web 
applications: MyReferences, TikiWiki, and phpBB, which 
allowed the assessment of IDS performance with different 
types of applications (MyReferences is small; TikiWiki and 
phpBB are large open source projects).  
- MyReferences is a bibliographic references management 
web application. The application was developed by the 
authors of [1]. It provides functionality for editing and 
querying documents and publications metadata. 
- TikiWiki (tiki.org) – a widely used Content Management 
System (CMS) platform that allows collaborative 
contribution of website contents in a wiki style.  
- phpBB (phpBB.com) – a widely used forum solution.  
Table I shows the total number of benign demands 
(crawling actions) and successful attacks8 for each application. 
Each IDS inspected the same traffic for each application.  
                                                           
5 https://github.com/JoseCarlosFonseca/Vulnerability-and-Attack-Injector  
6 https://github.com/larskanis/greensql-fw. For a commercial version see [5]. 
7 https://code.google.com/archive/p/apache-scalp/ 
8 As stated in [1], some attacks that were “unsuccessful”, i.e. they did not lead 
to an exploit of the vulnerability. In this paper we only consider the successful 
TABLE I.  THE COUNTS OF CRAWLING ACTIONS TRAFFIC AND 
SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS TRAFFIC PER WEB APPLICATION 
Web Application IDS Crawling Actions Successful Attack 
MyReferences 9 45 136 
phpBB 9 97 245 
TikiWiki 9 80 76 
As with any binary decision system, we can classify the 
decisions of an IDS into four classes: 
- For benign input: False Positive (FP): the IDS, incorrectly, 
flags a benign input as malicious; True Negative (TN): the 
IDS, correctly, flags a benign input as not malicious. 
- For attacks: False Negative (FN): the IDS, incorrectly, flags 
an attack as malicious; True Positive (TP): the IDS, 
correctly, flags an attack as malicious. 
As we mentioned previously, we used the conventional 
measures for the performance of a binary classification test: 
Sensitivity, Specificity and Accuracy. Many other measures 
can be derived from these or the FN, FP, TN and TP counts.  
Table II presents the 9 configurations of the IDSs, the 
labels we will use to refer to them in the graphs in the rest of 
the paper, and the Sensitivity and Specificity for each of the 
three applications. These were already provided in [1]. 
TABLE II.  THE 9 DISTINCT IDS DEPLOYMENTS  
Label IDS Name 
MyReferences phpBB TikiWiki 
Sens. Spec. Sens. Spec. Sens. Spec. 
1A ACD1 0.89 0.76 0.93 0.37 0.49 0.48 
2A ACD3 0.61 0.84 0.22 0.68 0.24 0.75 
3A ACD10 0.35 1 0.07 0.99 0.20 0.99 
4A ACD30 0.27 1 0.04 1 0.20 1 
5A ACD100 0.10 1 0.02 1 0.00 1 
6D GREENSQL 0.12 1 0.63 1 1 1 
7A SCALP sqlia 0.25 0.91 0 1 0.21 1 
8N SNORT 2.8 0 1 0 1 0 1 
9N SNORT 2.8 plus CR 0.59 1 1 1 0.5000 1 
In our work we extend the analysis from the viewpoint of 
diversity. From the 9 IDS configurations, we can build a total 
of 36 two-version combinations (9C2). The decision that a two-
version IDS system would make on a given input will depend 
on how it does the voting on the results it receives from each of 
the individual systems. We therefore have two types of 
configurations for each of the 36 combinations: 
- 1-out-of-2 (abbreviated 1oo2): an input is labelled 
malicious as long as any one of the two IDSs in a system 
determines that the input is malicious;   
- 2-out-of-2 (abbreviated 2oo2): an input is labelled 
malicious only if both IDS in the pair determine that the 
input is malicious. 
Receiver Operating Characteristic9 (ROC) curves are 
usually used to analyse the decisions of a binary classifier, and 
determine how a threshold should be set for a decision system 
to maximize the TP and minimize the FP rates. The systems in 
our study are already pre-configured, hence the ROC plots 
show only a point for each system. All the points for single and 
diverse systems are shown in the same plot to visualize which 
systems are configured most optimally for a given application.  
                                                                                                     
attacks, since we were uncertain on how to classify the behavior of an IDS if it 
does not raise an alarm for an attack that is not successful.  
9 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Receiver_operating_characteristic  
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III. DIVERSITY RESULTS 
A. Overall Analysis by Type of IDS Combination 
The technical report [2] contains tables outlining the full 
results for each of the applications that show the FP, TN, FN 
and TP values for the 1oo2 and 2oo2 system configurations. 
Figure I shows the three ROC plots that were constructed using 
these values: one for each of the three applications 
(MyReferences, phpBB and TikiWiki). On each plot: the blue 
diamonds represent the single IDS systems; the orange squares 
represent the 1oo2 systems; the green triangles represent the 
2oo2 systems. The most optimal system in an ROC plot is one 
that appears on the top left-hand corner (i.e. with a true positive 
rate of 1 and a false positive rate of 0). We have one such 
system for phpBB and TikiWiki, but none for MyReferences. 
We observe that, compared with the best individual systems: 
the 1oo2 systems are better at detecting attacks (higher true 
positive rate); 2oo2 systems are better at correctly labelling 
benign traffic (lower FP rates). This is to be expected as:  
- 1oo2 systems will in all cases perform: better or equal to 
the best single system in the pair for malicious traffic, as 
any alarm from either IDS will lead to an alarm in a 1oo2 
system; equal or worse than the worst single system in the 
pair for benign traffic, as any alarm from either system for 
benign traffic will be incorrectly labelled as malicious.  
- 2oo2 systems will in all cases perform: better or equal to 
the best single system for benign traffic as the 2oo2 system 
only raises an alarm for benign traffic if both systems in the 
pair do so; equal or worse than the worst single system in 
the pair for malicious traffic, as the 2oo2 system will only 
raise an alarm if both the systems in the pair do so. 
What is important is how much better, or how much worse, 
would a diverse pair perform in these setups, and ROC curves 
allow us to assess these differences. Figure II gives ROCs per 
application again, but now we have split the points of the 
“functionally redundant” pairs (subfigures a-c) - those when 
two individual systems in the pair are of the same type (15 
Application-only (AA); and 1 Network-only (NN) pairs); and 
“functionally diverse” (sub-figures d-f) pairs - those where the 
IDSs are of different types (12 Application and Network (AN); 
6 Application and Database (AD): and 2 Database and 
Network (DN) pairs). Overall, we see that the functionally 
diverse pairs are performing better than functionally redundant 
pairs (as evident by more 1oo2 systems (squares) appearing in 
the top half of the plot, and more 2oo2 systems (triangles) 
appearing on the left of the plot in subfigures d-f, compared 
with those in a-c). 
B. Differences Over a Single IDS Setup  
So far the results are useful for a decision maker who 
choses any two IDSs for a diverse setup. However, 
organizations may already be using an IDS, and costs of 
switching to a different pair of IDSs may be prohibitively high 
(in terms of licensing, re-training staff, etc.)  For these 
organizations it may be useful to know which IDS B they 
should choose to run alongside their existing IDS A in a 
diverse 1oo2 or 2oo2 AB setup. Figure III shows results for 
this type of comparison for MyReferences application. For 
each IDS, we show the improvements (positive values in the y-
axis), or deterioration (negative values in the y-axis), in 
Sensitivity (blue bars) and Specificity (orange bars) for 1oo2 
(sub-figure a), and 2oo2 (sub-figure b). Each IDS can be paired 
with 8 other IDSs in our study. Thus, the blue boxes on the x-
axis show the improvements for each IDS. Using the left-most 
box in subfigure a) as an example, the first orange bar shows 
the deterioration in specificity that a user of ACD1 would 
observe if they switched to a 1oo2 setup ACD1-ACD3. Since 
there is no corresponding blue bar it means there is no 
improvement in sensitivity for users of ACD1 from switching 
to a 1oo2 ACD1-ACD3 configuration. Note that for users of 
ACD3 the observation could be different, and indeed it is, as 
can be seen from the first bar in the second blue-box (ACD3). 
From Figure III (a), for 1oo2 setups, we observe: 
- For application-based IDSs, pairing with a functionally 
diverse IDS (“GreenSQL” or “Snort 2.8 plus Custom 
Rules”), in a 1oo2 setup brings considerable improvements 
in sensitivity at no cost to specificity;   
- For GreenSQL (database IDS) pairing with the 
functionally-diverse “Snort 2.8 plus Custom Rules”, 
ACD10, ACD30 and ACD100 in a 1oo2 setup brings 
considerable improvements in sensitivity at no cost to 
specificity.  
- For “Snort 2.8 plus Custom Rules” pairing with the 
functionally-diverse ACD10, ACD30 and ACD100, or with 
GreenSQL leads to improvements in sensitivity at no cost 
to specificity. 
These observations about functional diversity pairings are 
consistent for phpBB and TikiWiki also (results are in [2]). 
In 2oo2 setups (part (b) of Figure III) we observe some 
improvements in specificity but these are in most cases far 
outweighed by the significant deteriorations in sensitivity. 
C. Averages for Different Diverse Setups   
We conclude our analysis with a summary table (Table III) 
showing the average Sensitivity, Specificity and Accuracy for 
single IDSs compared with those for 1oo2 and 2oo2 
configurations. We have subdivided these averages by type of 
configurations, and show them for each application. These 
results confirm the observations we have presented so far. For 
1oo2 systems: improvements in sensitivity compared with 
individual systems are around 60% on average for the three 
applications, but come with around 10% specificity 
deterioration on average. For 2oo2 systems: improvements in 
specificity compared with individual systems are around 10% 
on average for the three applications, but come with around 
60% sensitivity deterioration on average. The largest 
improvements for both setups are for functionally diverse pairs.  
IV. RELATED WORK 
The security community is well aware of diversity as 
potentially valuable [7-8]. Research projects studied distributed 
systems using diverse products for intrusion tolerance (e.g. 
Cactus [9], HACQIT [10] and MAFTIA projects 
(tinyurl.com/ydazvy8u)), but little research exists on how to 
choose diverse defences (some examples in [8], [11-12]). An 
extensive survey on evaluation of IDSs is presented in [13]. 
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Fig.I THE   ROC PLOTS SHOWING THE INDIVIDUAL IDSS, 1OO2 AND 2OO2 CONFIGURATIONS. CHARTS a)-c) SHOW THE ROC FOR EACH APPLICATION  
a) ROC for MyReferences 
 
b) ROC for PHBBB 
 
c) ROC for TikiWiki 
 
Fig.II THE ROC PLOTS OF CONFIGURATIONS FOR EACH APPLICATION FOR a)-c) FUNCTIONALLY REDUNDANT PAIRS;  d)-f) FUNCTIONALLY DIVERSE PAIRS. 
a) ROC- Functionally Redundant - MyReferences 
 
b) ROC- Functionally Redundant - PHPBB 
 
c) ROC- Functionally Redundant - TikiWiki 
 
d) ROC- Functionally Diverse - MyReferences 
 
e) ROC- Functionally Diverse - PHPBB 
 
f) ROC- Functionally Diverse - TikiWiki 
 
Fig.III   DIFFERENCES IN SENSITIVITY AND SPECIFICITY FOR A SYSTEM A WHEN PAIRED WITH ANOTHER SYSTEM B  FOR MYREFERENCES FOR: A) 1OO2 B) 2OO2  PAIRS 
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TABLE III.  THE AVERAGE SENSITIVITY, SPECIFICITY AND 
ACCURACY FOR SINGLE IDSS AND THE 1OO2 AND 2002 PAIRS 
 
SQL Injection vulnerabilities exist due to user inputs that 
are not adequately validated, and are considered one of the 
most dangerous type of attacks for web applications [14], 
[15], [16]. Several works try to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of IDSs for SQL injection  (see survey in [17]). 
Given the relevance of these attacks, countermeasures have 
been investigated [18], [19], especially those capable of 
runtime detection and prevention of intrusions [20, 21]. 
V. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
In this paper we presented a well-documented, step-by-
step analysis methodology for assessing the performance of 
two-version security decision support systems, which allows 
researchers and organizations to assess diversity in their 
setups. We illustrated the use of the approach with diverse 
two-system IDS configurations. The analysis is performed 
using a previously published dataset [1], using 9 individual 
IDS configurations that monitor 3 web applications, that 
were subjected to SQL injection attacks and benign crawling 
actions. The main conclusions from our analysis are:  
- For 1oo2 systems: improvements in sensitivity compared 
with individual systems are around 60% on average for 
the three applications, but come with around 10% 
specificity deterioration on average. The largest 
improvements in sensitivity, with the least deterioration 
in specificity are from functionally-diverse pairs of IDSs;  
- For 2oo2 systems: improvements in specificity compared 
with individual systems are around 10% on average for 
the three applications, but come with around 60% 
sensitivity deterioration on average. 
There are a few limitations of the dataset we have used, 
that may influence our observations: 
- The dataset was gathered in 2010 and is limited to SQL 
Injections. However, as we mentioned previously, SQL 
Injection attacks continue to be the most prevalent and 
typical threat for web applications, as they have been for 
the last decade. Moreover, realistic attack datasets are 
very difficult to create and to the best of our knowledge 
our dataset is the most realistic SQL injection attack 
dataset available. 
- The dataset is for web applications only. However, web 
applications are the ones directly exposed to attackers.    
- The data is generated by a vulnerability and attack 
injection tool. Though we should stress that it is difficult 
to get operational datasets, as organisations rarely share 
them, so we took extra care to select attacks that were 
representative of those seen in the field.  
Current and future work is to assess the performance of 
diverse setups with more than two IDSs. 
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